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DTSTART:20180325T030000
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DTSTART:20171029T020000
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DTSTAMP:20260427T101502Z
UID:59ad2a0ad1c95464415471@ist.ac.at
DTSTART:20171115T123000
DTEND:20171115T133000
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Laura Schmid\nhosted by Beatriz Vicoso\nAbstract: Dire
 ct and indirect reciprocity are considered major factors in the evolution 
 of cooperation. Under direct reciprocity\, we help those who have helped u
 s in the past. In contrast\, under indirect reciprocity\, we help those wh
 o have helped someone else. Thus\, whereas direct reciprocity is based on 
 previous experiences with an individual\, indirect reciprocity is based on
  somebodys reputation. Both forms of reciprocity on their own contribute t
 o explaining the emergence of altruistic behavior in populations\; however
 \, there is little research on how these two mechanisms interact\, and pos
 sibly interfere with each other.In our work\, we introduce a novel framewo
 rk that blends the two approaches. We consider a repeated Prisoner's Dilem
 ma game played between the members of a population.  Players have direct i
 nteractions with each other\, but when they decide whether to cooperate\, 
 they can also be influenced by unrelated interactions they observe. We use
  this model to explore how individuals optimally make use of different sou
 rces of information\, and how the efficient interaction of direct and indi
 rect reciprocity facilitates the spread of cooperation throughout a networ
 k.
LOCATION:I22 Lakeside View (I22.01)\, ISTA
ORGANIZER:cfraisse@ist.ac.at
SUMMARY:Laura Schmid: Joint evolution of direct and indirect reciprocity
URL:https://talks-calendar.ista.ac.at/events/897
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