BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:icalendar-ruby
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Vienna
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
DTSTART:20250330T030000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=-1SU;BYMONTH=3
TZNAME:CEST
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20251026T020000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=-1SU;BYMONTH=10
TZNAME:CET
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260424T143329Z
UID:1749560400@ist.ac.at
DTSTART:20250610T150000
DTEND:20250610T160000
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Valentin Hübner\nhosted by Krishnendu Chatterjee\nAbs
 tract: Cooperation\, that is\, one person paying a cost for another’s be
 nefit\, is a fundamental principle without which no form of society could 
 exist. The extent to which humans cooperate with each other is also an ess
 ential feature that differentiates them from other animals. Cooperation oc
 curs even in the absence of altruistic motivations\, when it is selfishly 
 incentivised by the expectation of a future reward. For example\, many eco
 nomic interactions are well described that way. This kind of cooperation r
 equires that people exhibit reciprocal behaviour that acts as a mechanism 
 that rewards cooperation.With game-theoretic models\, it is possible to fo
 rmally study potential such mechanisms and under what conditions they can 
 exist. This thesis contributes to this effort by analysing recently introd
 uced models of cooperation that advance on previous work by taking into ac
 count the potential for pre-existing inequality among cooperating individu
 als as well as the different forms that reciprocity can take.Individuals m
 ay differ both intrinsically\, in their abilities\, as well as extrinsical
 ly\, in the amount of resources they have available. Allowing for such dif
 ferences in a model of cooperation helps to understand how inequality affe
 cts the potential for\, and outcomes of\, cooperation among unequals. In t
 his thesis\, it is shown that in the presence of intrinsic inequality\, a 
 similar unequal distribution of resources can increase the potential for c
 ooperation. This effect is stronger the smaller the group is in which coop
 eration takes place. It is also shown that under particular assumptions\, 
 if the unequal members of a group vary the size of their contributions to 
 a cooperative effort over time\, they can thereby increase their efficienc
 y and improve the collective outcome.Cooperative behaviour in a two-person
  interaction can be rewarded either by direct reciprocation whenever the s
 ame two people interact again\, or indirectly by a third party who observe
 d the interaction. In the latter case of indirect reciprocity\, individual
 s are proximally rewarded by a good reputation\, which ultimately translat
 es to being rewarded with cooperative behaviour by others. This mechanism 
 can enable selfishly motivated cooperation even in circumstances where ind
 ividuals are unlikely to meet again\, akin to how money facilitates trade.
  While these two forms of reciprocity have mostly been studied in isolatio
 n\, this thesis analyses both direct and indirect reciprocity in a general
  model in order to compare their relative effectiveness under different ci
 rcumstances. The contribution of this thesis is an extension of previous w
 ork regarding a specific kind of interaction\, whose parameters allow for 
 convenient mathematical analysis\, to the most general set of possible int
 eractions.
LOCATION:Sunstone Bldg / Ground floor / Big Seminar Room A (I23.EG.102) and
  Zoom\, ISTA
ORGANIZER:
SUMMARY:Valentin Hübner: Thesis Defense: Reciprocity and inequality in soc
 ial dilemmas
URL:https://talks-calendar.ista.ac.at/events/5797
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR